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BOOK REVIEWS
THE COURT-MARTIAL OF GENERAL GEORGE ARMSTRONG CUSTER,
by Lawrence A. Frost. Norman, Oklahoma 73069; University of
Oklahoma Press, 1968, pp. xviii, 280. $5.95.
In this that Brevet1 Major General George A. Custer,
Lieutenant Colonel, 7th U.S. Cavalry, while commanding
and marching a column of his regiment, six companies or
thereabouts strong, did, on or about the seventh day of July
1867, at a point about fifteen miles south of Platte River,
and about fifty miles south west from Fort Sedgewick, Colo-
rado, order and cause the summary shooting, as a supposed
deserter, but without trial, of one Private Charles Johnson,
Company K, 7th U.S. Infantry, a soldier of his command;
whereby he, the said Johnson was so severely wounded that
he soon after-to wit, on or about the 17th day of July, 1867,
at or near Fort Wallace, Kansas-did decease; he the said
Custer thus causing the death of him the said Johnson. 2
The foregoing is the most serious and the most graphic of the
many charges which precipitated General Custer's court-martial
in 1867.
The events which resulted in his trial and temporary fall from
grace occurred some nine years before the tragic massacre at Little
Big Horn. They are recounted here with dramatic skill and scholarly
patience. This is a book of history, not of law. As history, it is
delightful reading. The author knows his characters and has con-
siderable expertise in the military history of the mid-nineteenth
century. He also has a flair for reporting and his descriptions of
the routine of a cavalry regiment on the march are vivid and
straightforward. His account of the trial and its surrounding events
is objective and well documented. As may be expected, the author
has a certain sympathy for his protagonist. Nevertheless, he has
his ear well tuned to the intrigues of the times and is sensible,
both of the betrayals and exploitation of the Indian by the land-
1. Brevet rank was awarded for meritorious service or heroism. It carried no com-
mand authority nor did the holder receive pay based on brevet rank. Brevet ranks were
intended to be temporary but they were never recalled and officers holding brevet rank
continued to be addressed as such. See p. 98, n. 1.
2. Specification Fourth of the Additional Charge, p. 102.
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hungry whites and the savage depredations of the displaced red men.
It is perhaps unfair to evaluate the book from a legal point of
view. Its purport as a legal source book is simply to set out verbatim,
the record of General Custer's court-martial, with, however, the
omission of "repetitious legal formality." 3
Nevertheless, the lawyer reader would have preferred to have
had the entire record reproduced, together with extracts of perti-
nent statutory and regulatory material bearing upon the charges
and the procedure then obtaining in trials-by courts-martial. Had
such material been included, the value of the book as a legal refer-
ence would have been considerably enhanced. As it is, it is extremely
useful. It whets the appetite of the reader interested in military
legal history and provides an insight into the system of military
justice prevailing in the early years following the Civil War.
General Custer was brought to trial for derelictions he allegedly
committed while commanding a contingent4 of the Seventh Cavalry
on a march to scout an area in Western Kansas, Nebraska and
Colorado.5 The march experienced ill-luck from the start. The
troops had hardly been on the trail a week when one of Custer's
senior staff officers committed suicide while drunk. Bad food,6
conflicting instructions 7 widespread desertions and a route of
march marked by savage Indian massacres, cholera epidemics and
daily evidence of broken treaties, political intrigue and bureaucratic
bungling, foredoomed Custer's expedition.
The whole fiasco began when General Hancock incensed friendly
Indians by burning a village he thought abandoned.8 This united
the tribes and changed a condition of sporadic raids to all out war.
Someone had to be blamed for the failure of the campaign to
pacify the Indians. It was Custer's misfortune to have liberally in-
terpreted his orders to suit his own convenience and to have dis-
played poor judgment in handling his troop. His misdeeds took the
pressure off his superiors and he became the scapegoat.
The author devotes 95 pages to outlining this thesis. 9 The
remainder of the book deals with the court-martial and its after-
math. The interrogation of the witnesses is reproduced verbatim and
3. See Preface at p. x. There is no analysis of the legal issues. Of the early authorities,
such as O'Brien, Maltby, Benet and Winthrop, only Benet is cited. See p. 123.
4. Between 300 and 350 men. See p. 37.
5. His mission was to investigate Indian depredations and clear the area of unfriendly
Indians.
6. Some hardtack supplied the troops had originally been packaged for issue during
the Civil War. (p. 79).
7. Towards the end of the march, Custer was ordered to proceed to Fort Wallace and
there meet General Hancock who would give him further orders. When Custer reached
Fort Wallace, General Hancock had already left, but without leaving Custer any new
orders.
8. P. 24.
9. Chapters 1 to 9 inclusive.
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the rulings of the court and comments of the parties are described
in detail.
The charges and specifications against Custer, to all of which
he pleaded not guilty, fell into two groups. Charge I of the original
charges, alleged absence without leave, in that Custer left his com-
mand at Fort Wallace without proper authority and went to Fort
Harker from which point he was able to obtain permission from
his next superior there present to visit his family at Fort Riley. His
defense that he wanted to expedite securing supplies pending receipt
of further orders from General Hancock was somewhat specious,
considering that the route he took made it easier for him to visit
his family and that he left his command in a precarious position.
However, he was acquitted of this charge.
The second charge (Charge II of the original charges) alleged
three specifications of conduct to the prejudice of good order and
military discipline. Specification One of this charge alleged Custer
had executed a rapid march on private business without authority
and in so doing damaged horses belonging to the Government.
Custer was acquitted of this specification but found guilty of the
second specification ° of this charge which alleged that Custer had
wrongfully appropriated some Government ambulances and mules
when he made the journey from Fort Wallace to Fort Harker on
purported "private business." However, in its findings, the Court
attached no criminality to Custer's conduct respecting the use of the
ambulances and mules. Custer was found not guilty of the third
specification of this charge, which alleged he had been derelict in
failing to take proper measures to rescue some of his men who
had been attacked by Indians. The net result of these findings was
that Custer was found guilty of the charge and guilty (but without
criminality), of one specification and not guilty of the remaining
specification of the charge.
Had that been all that had been alleged against Custer, the
sentence would probably have been a reprimand. But Custer, a
teetotaler, had accused one of his officers, a Major West, of being
drunk on duty and West wanted revenge. He filed additional
charges against Custer under the general article'l alleging four
10. There appears to be some ambiguity in the findings or In the author's report of
them. The findings described at page 245 respecting Specification 1, Charge 1, mention
ambulances and numbers of mules, but this language obviously relate%3 to Specification 2,
Charge 11; see pp. 99, 100.
11. At the time, Article 99 of the Articles of War of 1806, which provided:
All crimes not capital, and all disorderts and neglects which officers and sol-
diers may be guilty of, to the prejudice of good order and military discipline,
though not mentioned in the foregoing articles of war, are to be taken cogni-
zance of by a general or regimental court-martial, according to the nature
and degree of the offense, and be punished at their discretion.
This articlej which is derived from Sec. XX, Art. III of the British Articles of War
of 1765, has its modern counterpart in Art. 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
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instances of conduct to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline. The incident that gave rise to these charges occurred
on July 7, 1867. Custer was faced with a rash of desertions and when
the cry was raised that a group of men with weapons (and some
with horses) were leaving the camp in broad daylight without
authority, Custer acted quickly to send a detail to capture them.
Three of the alleged deserters were shot, one of whom subsequently
died. Of the others, some surrendered and the rest made their
escape, for what it was worth, into hostile Indian country.
The testimony is conflicting as to what followed from Custer's
careless use of phrases such as "shoot to kill" and "bring none of
them back alive, ' 12 but he was found guilty of ordering three sol-
diers pursued as suspected deserters to be shot down without trial
(Specification two) 13 and to have wrongfully caused the death of
Private Johnson as alleged in Specification four, quoted at the be-
ginning of this review. His alleged callousness in refusing to allow
the wounded deserters to obtain medical care was not established
(Specification three).
The sentence, which reviewing authorities refused to mitigate
because they believed the court had granted clemency to Custer,
was "to be suspended from rank and command for one year and
forfeit his pay for the same time.1
1 4
Some observations from a legal point of view merit mention.
The court-martial that tried Custer had no presiding legal officer,
nor was either the Government nor the defense represented by quali-
fied counsel, yet it is safe to say that the parties involved were
thoroughly familiar with military law and there is no suggestion
of lack of competence or preparation by either side.
The rights of the defense when compared to a present day
court-martial were certainly minimal. Under the then prevailing
procedure, the accused could be represented by his military friend
and legal counsel but he had no right as he does at present to the
services of a qualified lawyer at Government expense. Unless, as
was done in this case, the court waived the requirement, he had to
submit questions in writing to be asked of witnesses and could not
interrupt the testimony by prompt objections. The testimony was
transcribed in long hand or a form of short hand by a phonographic
reporter, who read back the testimony of the witness before he
left the stand whereupon the witness was asked if he agreed with
the transcription.
12. See pp. 150-155, 159-163, 178-179 and the report of the subsequent civil trial at pp.
262-263. Under the circumstances, it would be easy for the pursuers to plead self defense
had they been charged, however literally they might choose to follow the illegal shoot
to kill order.
13. The findings included exceptions and substitutions not here pertinent
14. P. 246.
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The testimony, were it to be offered in a present day court-
martial, would face some minor exclusionary challenges. Leading
questions abound, as do questions calling improperly for the opinion
of witnesses. The record discloses some hearsay but it is basically
harmless. The defense claimed prejudice by the court's denial of
a defense objection on the ground that a witness who had previously
testified on direct and cross-examination could not again be called
by the prosecution to give evidence on a new matter. Lieutenant
Cook was recalled to give damaging evidence concerning the Specifi-
cation Four of the Additional Charge after he had previously testified
respecting Charge II of the original charges. The objection here
seems a bit specious because the conduct of the trial was made
more orderly by calling evidence on the additional charges after all
of the witnesses with respect to the original charges had been
heard. There is, however, some justification for the thesis that the
prosecution waives re-direct unless he obtains the court's permis-
sion to recall witnesses later in the case.
With respect to the aftermath of the trial, the author relates
that Custer spent his period of suspension relaxing at Fort Leaven-
worth where for a time he was the guest of General Sheridan. Later
Custer returned to his home state of Michigan where he spent
his time writing and fishing.
But his troubles were not over. He carried on a battle in the
press over the events of the campaign and was brought to trial
before the civil courts in Kansas on a charge of murdering Private
Johnson. His co-defendant was Lieutenant Cook, who had fired the
fatal shot. These charges against Custer were promptly dismissed, 5
but his battle with the press was to continue.
Slightly less than a year later, Custer was returned to favor.
His pay and rank restored, he was ordered back to Fort Hays
fortified by more vague orders of the kind that would give scope
to his dashing character and perpetuate the Custer legend.' 6
In sum, this is not a source book for the advocate, but it has
value to the legal historian and more especially to the reader inter-
ested in the role of the Army in the settlement of the Plains. It
is a good book and well worth reading.
HAROLD D. CUNNINGHAM, JR.*
15. P. 263, The reader is not informed of what happened to Lieutenant Cook.
16. "On October 4, he wrote to Libbie (Mrs. Custer) from Fort Hays:
I breakfasted with Genl. Sheridan and staff, he said, 'Custer, I rely on you
in everything, and shall send you on this expedition without orders, leaving
,vou to act entirely on your own judgement'." (P. 267).
* B.A., Manhattan College; LL.B. Boston College Law School; IL.M. New York
University School of Law; B.C.L. Oxford University, England; Dean, University of North
Dakota School of Law.
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THE LAW OF AIRSPACE, by Robert R. Wright. Bobbs-Merrill
Co., Inc. 4300 W. 62nd St., Indianapolis, Indiana 46268, 575 pages.
$17.50. 1968.
The author suggests that this book is primarily on "the legal
aspects of airspace utilization from the standpoint of property rights
and on various types of airspace transactions and the considerations
in connection with them.
' I
In The Law of Airspace, Professor Wright has actually pro-
duced two books in one, for the law of airspace as it applies to
aeronautics is quite different from the law of airspace as used in
the context of air rights over railroad tracks or existing streets,
or ownership rights in high-rise condominiums. The justification
for this somewhat forced marriage lies in the common heritage
each shares in the concepts of airspace ownership existing prior
to the aircraft.
Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum.
Like most treatises or tomes on the subject of airspace rights this
ancient doctrine is given extensive consideration by the author.
Through two chapters, one devoted to its English background, and
the other to its application in America, he traces its origin and
development. Appropriately so! For it constitutes both a point of
beginning and a partial point of departure for any scholarly treat-
ment of the subject.
It is a point of beginning because of its historical origins altera-
tively attributed to a statement of the Roman glossator Accursius
of Bologna:
Cujus est solum ejus debet esse usque ad coelum.
to Jews carrying it with them from the Continent to England with
the Norman conquest; and finally to the English appearing in (Lord)
Coke on Littleton (1628) .2
The first reference to the maxim in England is considered to
be contained in a note to Bury v. Pope 3 a sixteenth century case
involving an action for blocking out the light to the building of an
adjacent property owner. As Professor Wright points out, probably
the best known expression of the concept is found in Blackstone:
Land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefinite extent,
upwards as well as downwards. Cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum (whoever has the land possesses all the
space upwards to an indefinite extent), it is the maxim of
1. WRIGHT, THE LAW or AIRSPAcE 5 (1968).
2. Id. at 15.
,. Cro. Eliz. 118, 78 Eng. Rep. 375 (ex. 1587).
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the law; upwards, therefore, no man may erect any build-
ing, or the like to overhang another's land: and downwards,
whatever is in direct line, between the surface of any land
and the centre of the earth, belongs to the owner of the
surface . . . So that the word "land" includes not only the
face of the earth, but every thing under it, or over it."
It is a partial point of departure in the sense that it has no practical
applicability in solving the legal problems of aeronautics and astro-
nautics if allowed its absolute meaning and given consistent en-
forcement.
Beyond the historical "ad coelum" chapters, a single extensive
chapter entitled: "Aviation and Airspace Ownership," considers
the entire spectrum of aeronautical questions related to property
rights in the surface.
The case of United States v. Causby5 is treated as pivotal.
The presently accepted role of real property ownership in litigation
stemming from disturbances by aircraft of the use and enjoyment
of the surface dates from the Causby case, not from the so-called
"ad coelum" doctrine, although the majority opinion of Justice
Douglas does make specific reference to it.
Holding the doctrine "has no place in the modern world," 6
the court recognized the statutory7 public right of transit in the
navigable airspace, but went on to state that as an incident to
dominion over the surface the landowner owns "at least" as much
superadjacent space as he can occupy or use in connection with
his enjoyment of the surface. The standard of a "taking," therefore,
was whether flights over private land "are so low and so frequent
as to be a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land," and the measure of damages the demonstrable
diminishing in the monetary value of the surface as a result thereof.
Many authorities consider the Causby rationale to be a prag-
matic product of the procedural and jurisdictional problems with
which the Supreme Court was confronted in reaching the obviously
desired relief for the Causbys 8 and now partially outdated by more
recent federal statutes. 9 The decision did establish recovery none-
theless on the basis of ownership and, as a result, Professor Wright
4. Wright, 4aupra note 1, at 13, quoting 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIRE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, Ch. 2, at 19 (p. 445 In I Cooley 4th ed. 1899).
5. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
6. Id, at 260-261.
7. Section 6 of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 and Section 3 of the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938.
8. The suit was instituted in the Court of Claims, under the Tucker Act, against the
United States, asserting a "taking" by the United States of their property for which they
were entitled to compensation in accordance with the Fifth Amndment. The Federal Tort
Claims Act (1946) permitting a tort action against the United States had not yet come
into being.
9. BILLYOU, Am LAW, 49-50 (2d ed. 1964).
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believes that it did not completely abolish the "ad coelum" doctrine,
but rather made the doctrine "responsive to the economic and social
demands of the air age while recognition was simultaneously ac-
corded to its inherent limitations." ' 1o
The rather obvious fact that such objectionable elements as
noise, dust, dirt, landing light glare, noxious smoke and extreme
vibrations can be equally unsettling and equally destructive of
property values even when conducted over adjacent property was
not considered in Causby. The author goes on to consider the line
of cases since Causby whether based upon nuisance, trespass or
eminent domain where direct overflights have not been pre-requi-
sites of recovery. While he states that recovery without direct over-
flight of the land in question is still in the minority, concern is
expressed that wide spread acceptance of recovery without physical
overflight "might well extend over into the highway area of liti-
gation" with the potential underlying economic ramifications."
In conclusion Professor Wright suggests that Causby and sub-
sequent cases indicate that recovery ultimately must rest largely
upon the facts of the individual cases and the severity of the economic
loss.
While the aviation aspects are by no means pioneering, (e.g.
Charles S. Rhyne in 1944 wrote extensively on the subject in his
Airports and the Courts) they do represent a comprehensive col-
lection of case authority and statement of theoretical positions of
case authority and statement of theoretical positions of recovery
for aircraft disturbances to the use and enjoyment of the surface
to the present time.
However, it is in the other areas of airspace rights that this
book makes its greatest contribution. Professor Wright considers
the modern condominium, the most recent development of the
upper chamber concept, as the device of city-dwellers stemming
from an urban society, land scarcity, and the desire for individual
ownership of real estate. He traces its origin and growth to the
current impact which it now has on existing real property law,
citing differentiating factors between ownership of a condominium
and ownership of unenclosed space, and concluding that there is a
close interrelationship between condominium airspace units, the
common law "upper chamber" and the sale or lease of airspace
over highway and railroad rights of way from a property stand-
point .12
In another chapter, considering the problems of ownership of
10. Wright, supra note 1, at 208-209.
11. Id . at 180-181.
12. Id. at 98-99.
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airspace in America, the author observes that commercial, and
public use, and development of airspace concepts and applications
are only beginning, and will become more critical as urban prob-
lems intensify.' s
Tracing American airspace case law in highway and bridge,
railroad, and finally, condominium cases, Professor Wright shows
that the courts have been cognizant generally of the modern need
for the creation of separate interests in airspace unconnected with
ownership of the surface.
However, he suggests the somewhat surprising and incongruous
situation:
(1) Case law relating to sales or leases of airspace or
rights in airspace is rather sparse, and;
(2) The practice of purchasing or leasing airspace or other-
wise acquiring rights in airspace is quite common in large
urban areas today. 14
Noting recent state and federal enactments permitting the creation
of ownership and subdivision of airspace, the author cites the fact
that the condominium has had such an impact that every state,
save Vermont, has enacted legislation to aid in the regulation and
conduct of this form of property ownership. Similar treatment has
been afforded or is being considered in regard to airspace rights
over highways and railroads.
To demonstrate the increasing utilization of airspace rights, a
substantial section of the book consists of numerous illustrations of
commercial applications of airspace. The prospective purchaser of
airspace rights is placed on notice that he will possibly confront
statutes or regulations, or both, on the federal and state level
impairing the traditional concepts of "fee simple" ownership.
The problem of valuation of airspace is also given extensive
treatment, including the problems of appraisal, appraisal tech-
niques, the determoination of market value, and methodology. Efforts
to show the reader the maze of problems that one may encounter
in the appraisal of airspace value as well as the application of
various formula thereto are well handled in a chapter treating that
specific area. In concluding this topic, after reviewing various ap-
praisal approaches, the author observes that the Kuehnule method
of commercial airspace valuation, along with certain derivations,
should prove to be of sufficient theoretical soundness to withstand
13. Id. at 259-260.
14. Id. at 211.
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any judicial scrutiny which might ultimately be applied, as far as
the legitimacy of the methodological framework is concerned. 15
The final major chapter outlines the airspace transaction from
its inception to completion. The various types of legal arrangements
and the legal instruments used in transferring rights in airspace,
and methods of description employed are clearly set forth for the
reader.
Essential to a review of this sort is an estimate of worth of the
subject book and the readership which will find it of primary value.
By his own terms the author states that it is not his intention to
provide the practicing attorney with a "form book," although many
sample documents and/or instruments are included in an appendix.
He views his book as a "compendium of law and practice" for
lawyers, but hopefully, to some extent different, based upon the
idea that the lawyer's function itself is somewhat different now than
in other times-he must know a reasonable amount about a great
many things. Accordingly the book goes beyond the usual legal
treatise and becomes a more far-reaching social document with
broader implications. Thus the volume, as well as being a worthy
addition to the property section of the practitioner's library, is also
of value to scholars, real estate brokers, public administrators and
the lay public on the implications and applications of airspace in
modern society.
Looking toward the future, the author sees the full utilization
of airspace as another planning tool, a part of the total fabric to
be woven by planners and civic leaders in shaping the environment
of urban America of the 1970's and 1980's and beyond.18 He considers
airspace as another economic resource, like water, minerals and
the soil, to be used wisely and in balance with other factors which
rank high on our scale of values. Its utilization is a part of the total
urban picture for which governments must plan. How wisely we
use it, as in all things, is dependent upon how wisely we see the
vision of the years to come.
CARL E. B. MCKENRY, JR.*
15. Kuehnle points out that the value of the airspace interest decreases as the construc-
tion costs, interference with reasonable use, and added costs of maintenance Increase. The
Kuehnle formula Is as follows:
V (X + Y) - I = A
V-A =R
V reresents the land value before removing the airspace interest.
X represents the economic value lost due to reduction of utility and income in the
design of the building for airspace construction.
Y represents the additional cost of construction.
I represents the interest on the investment for the increased period of construction
resulting from the divided space-surface interests.
A represents the value of the "air-rights" after severance of the airspace.
R represents the value of the remainder.
16. Wright, supra note 1, at 419.
* A.B., J.D., LL.M. University of Miami; LL.M., New York University; Associate Pro-
fessor of Tranrportation Management and Law, University of Miami (joint appointment
between the School of Law and the School of Business.)
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